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NOTE 
Balancing Act: Admissibility of Propensity 
Evidence Under Article I, Section 18(c) of 
the Missouri Constitution 
Emily Holtzman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The American legal system has a long-standing ban against using charac-
ter evidence to show a party’s propensity to act in conformity with that charac-
ter.  This rule has been especially stringent in the criminal system, where the 
notion is that when a criminal defendant is tried for a crime, that defendant 
should face trial only for the crimes charged.  However, certain crimes, like sex 
crimes, can be incredibly difficult to prosecute and, accordingly, victim advo-
cates have pushed for changes to these rules.  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
(“FRE”) and several states have enacted rules that allow evidence of prior bad 
acts to be used as propensity evidence in prosecutions of sex crimes.1  In 2014, 
Missouri voters enacted a similar rule for prosecutions of child sex abuse cases 
by amending the Missouri Constitution.2 
These changes to the total bar on propensity evidence have received im-
mense push back.  Critics argue that these rules violate the rights normally 
given to criminal defendants and stress the general unreliability of propensity 
evidence.  Supporters of these rules, on the other hand, argue that because sex 
crimes are so difficult to prosecute – often due to a lack of eyewitnesses and 
physical evidence – this evidence is crucial in making sure guilty offenders are 
properly punished.  Supporters and critics disagree about whether sex offenders 
  
*  B.A. University of Missouri 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2020; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020.  I would like to thank 
Professor Ben Trachtenberg for his guidance in writing this Note, as well as the Mis-
souri Law Review editorial staff for their assistance and dedication. 
 1. See FED. R. EVID. 413; ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2), (3) (allowing propensity 
evidence for prosecutions of crimes involving physical or sexual abuse of minors and 
sexual assault in any degree if the defendant relies on a defense of consent); ARIZ. R. 
EVID. 404(c) (allowing propensity evidence in civil and criminal cases involving sexual 
offenses and requiring the court to make specific findings that the “evidentiary value 
of proof of the other act is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice); 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2)(b), (c) (West 2014); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 24-4-413 (West 2013); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115–7.3 (West 2014); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-455(d) (West 2015); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412.2 (West 
2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-414 (2010); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 38.37 
(West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.04(2)(b)(2) (West 2014). 
 2. MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(C). 
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differ from other criminal offenders in their likelihood to commit the same 
crime in the future.  Now that the amendment has had a few years to affect 
cases and be heard by Missouri appellate courts and the Missouri Supreme 
Court, a critical look at the application of this rule in is ripe.  
In Part I, this Note discusses the Missouri rule which allows the admission 
of propensity evidence in prosecutions of child sex abuse, as codified in Article 
I, Section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution.  Part II of this Note discusses the 
state of the law leading to the adoption of FRE 413, 414, and 415.  Part II then 
analyzes how these rules laid the framework for the change reflected in the 
Missouri Constitution.  Part III of this Note highlights case law decided after 
the Missouri amendment and details how the Missouri Supreme Court’s anal-
ysis in child sex abuse prosecutions has changed in light of the admissibility of 
propensity evidence in these cases.  Part III also discusses the discretion given 
to courts in admitting evidence of prior similar crimes.  Part IV outlines the 
arguments for and against this type of evidence.  This note concludes by sug-
gesting Missouri courts employ a stronger balancing test to admit propensity 
evidence in child sex abuse cases as a way to navigate these difficult cases. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The bar against the admission of character, or “propensity,” evidence has 
a long tradition in common law.3  In criminal trials, the main concern with 
allowing a jury to hear evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or other acts is 
that the introduction of such crimes or acts will be unfairly prejudicial to the 
defendant, in that a jury might convict a defendant based on those prior acts 
and not the charged crime.4  The United States Supreme Court has explained 
the reasoning behind this rule is not “because character is irrelevant; on the 
contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so over persuade 
them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair oppor-
tunity to defend against a particular charge.”5 
One of the earliest cases to articulate this justification was People v. 
Zackowitz,6 where the Court of Appeals of New York vacated a conviction be-
cause character evidence was introduced at trial.7  In that case, there was no 
question whether the defendant shot and killed the victim; the issue was instead 
  
 3. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) (“Courts that follow the 
common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prose-
cution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a probability 
of his guilt.”). 
 4. Id. at 476.  
 5. Id. at 475–76 (“The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its 
admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to pre-
vent confusion of issues, unfair surprise, and undue prejudice.”). 
 6. 254 N.Y. 192 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1930). 
 7. Id. at 200.  
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what degree of murder fit the facts.8  This hinged on whether the murder was 
premeditated.9  At trial, the government presented evidence that Zackowitz 
kept at least three guns in his apartment, which, according to Chief Judge Ben-
jamin Cardozo, the government used to show Zackowitz’s “vicious and dan-
gerous propensities.”10  On appeal, the court concluded that the government 
presented Zackowitz as a dangerous person – as seen by his gun collection – 
and because of this, he was more likely to have committed premeditated mur-
der.11  In fact, at trial the jury found Zackowitz guilty of first-degree murder.12  
The Court of Appeals of New York vacated Zackowitz’s conviction because 
the evidence of Zackowitz’s gun collection clearly violated the common law 
rule against propensity evidence.13  Specifically, Cardozo explained that in al-
lowing the evidence of Zackowitz’s gun collection, he was put on trial for bad 
conduct that was “more general and sweeping” than the offense charged.14 
The FRE were adopted in 1975, and Rule 404 codified the common law 
rule announced in Zackowitz barring propensity evidence.15  Rule 404 states 
that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to 
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character or trait.”16  At least forty states have since followed suit by codifying 
rules against propensity evidence.17  While rules against propensity evidence 
had a strong common law foundation and were generally well-accepted, critics 
soon pointed to the roadblocks these rules presented in prosecutions of rape 
and sexual assault. 
A.  Adoption and Controversy of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, 
and 415 
In 1994, Congress created FRE 413, 414, and 415 with the passage of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.18  These rules codified an 
explicit exception to the prohibition of character evidence in cases of sexual 
  
 8. Id. at 193.  
 9. Id. at 194–95.  
 10. Id. at 196.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 193.  
 13. Id. at 197 (citing WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Vol. 1 §§ 55, 192 (1915)). 
 14. People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 199 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1930) (“[b]rought to 
answer a specific charge, and to defend himself against it, he was placed in a position 
where he had to defend himself against another, more general and sweeping”). 
 15. FED. R. EVID. 404.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Tamara Rice Lave & Aviva Orenstein, Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: 
A Critical Look at the Admission of Prior Sex Crimes, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 795, 801 
(2013). 
 18. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–
322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1918–19 (1994). 
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abuse by allowing courts to admit evidence of prior similar crimes or conduct 
against a defendant accused of rape, sexual assault, or child molestation.  Spe-
cifically, Rule 413 states “[i]n a criminal case in which a defendant is accused 
of sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed 
any other sexual assault.”19  Rule 413 further provides “[t]he evidence may be 
considered on any matter to which it is relevant.”20  Rule 413 sets out a notice 
condition as well, stating that a prosecutor must disclose the intent to offer this 
evidence to a criminal defendant at least 15 days before trial.21  Rule 414 cre-
ates an exception to propensity evidence for criminal cases of child molesta-
tion, stating that in those cases “the court may admit evidence that the defend-
ant committed any other child molestation.”22  Rule 414 similarly states that 
the “evidence may be considered on any matter which it is relevant” and con-
tains the same notice requirement as Rule 413.23  Rule 415 makes Rules 413 
and 414 applicable in any “civil case involving a claim for relief based on a 
party’s alleged sexual assault or child molestation.”24  After the adoption of 
Rules 413, 414, and 415 into the FRE, states across the country followed suit.25 
B.  Legislative History of Sex Crimes Exception to Character Evidence 
in Missouri 
The Missouri Legislature responded to the addition of FRE 413, 414, and 
415 with legislation that closely mirrored the federal statute.26  The legislature 
decided, however, to limit the exception to the bar on propensity evidence to 
cases of child molestation.27  In 1994, the Missouri Legislature enacted Section 
566.025 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (“1994 Statute”) which provided that, 
in prosecutions for sex crimes committed against victims under the age of four-
  
 19. FED. R. EVID. 413. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. FED. R. EVID. 414. 
 23. Id.  
 24. FED. R. EVID. 415.  
 25. Thirteen other states and the military have enacted rules allowing introduction 
of propensity evidence in sexual assault cases; Maryland and Nevada have case law 
that allows introduction of this evidence. BARBARA E. BERGMAN ET AL., WHARTON’S 
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 33:1, 34:1 (15th ed. 2018).  Sixteen other states and the military 
have enacted rules allowing introduction of propensity evidence in child molestation 
cases; Maryland and Nevada again have case law that allows introduction of this evi-
dence. Id.; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–1420 (allowing introduction of prior crim-
inal acts that constitute a sexual offense if a defendant is charged with a sexual offense); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16–10–301; ILL. R. EVID. 413; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108; 
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.37; VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:413. 
 26. See MO. REV. STAT. § 566.025 (1994), invalidated by State v. Burns, 978 
S.W.2d 759, 760 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 27. Id.  
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teen, “evidence of charged or uncharged crimes involving victims under four-
teen years of age shall be admissible for the purpose of showing the propensity 
of the defendant to commit the crime or crimes with which he is charged.”28  
Under the 1994 Statute, such evidence was admissible as long as the prior acts 
occurred within ten years of the current claims.29  
In State v. Burns,30 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the 1994 Statute 
violated the Missouri Constitution because it violated criminal defendants’ 
right to be tried “only on the offense charged.”31  Specifically, the court held 
the statute violated Article I, Section 17, which states “no person shall be pros-
ecuted criminally for felony or misdemeanor otherwise than by indictment or 
information,” and Article I, Section 18(a), which states that in “criminal pros-
ecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation.”32  A jury convicted defendant Burns of first-degree statutory 
sodomy and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison.33  On appeal to the Mis-
souri Supreme Court, Burns challenged the constitutionality of the 1994 Statute 
because, under the statute, the trial court allowed the government to admit tes-
timony from two witnesses about uncharged prior sexual abuse committed by 
Burns.34 
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed Burns’ conviction and remanded 
for a new trial, holding that the evidence permitted at trial under the 1994 Stat-
ute violated Burns’ rights under the Missouri Constitution.35  Specifically, the 
court stated that admitting into evidence uncharged crimes of the defendant 
functioned as trying the defendant for crimes not indicted in the current action, 
which directly contradicted Article I, Section 17 of the Missouri Constitution.36  
The court discussed the longstanding rule against the admissibility of propen-
sity evidence, citing its own precedent that “showing the defendant’s propen-
sity to commit a given crime is not a proper purpose for admitting evidence, 
because such evidence ‘may encourage the jury to convict the defendant be-
cause of his propensity to commit such crimes without regard to whether he is 
actually guilty of the crime charged.’”37 
  
 28. State v. Burns, 978 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (quoting MO. REV. 
STAT. § 566.025 (2018)) (emphasis added). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 760.  
 32. Id.; MO. CONST. art. I, § § 17, 18(a).  While these two sections of the Missouri 
Constitution do not explicitly prohibit character evidence, Missouri courts have inter-
preted these sections to do just that.  See State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. 
1993) (en banc); State v. Naylor, 510 S.W.3d 855, 862 (Mo. 2017) (en banc); State v. 
Matthews, 552 S.W.3d 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). 
 33. Burns, 978 S.W.2d at 759. 
 34. Id. at 760.  
 35. Id. at 759–62.  
 36. Id. at 760–61.  
 37. Id. at 761 (quoting State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)). 
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After the court invalidated the 1994 Statute as unconstitutional, the Mis-
souri Legislature passed an updated version of the statute that added a balanc-
ing test requirement in 2000 (“2000 Statute”).38  The 2000 Statute stated that 
admission of evidence of prior similar crimes “shall be admissible for the pur-
pose of showing the propensity of the defendant to commit the crime . . . with 
which he or she is charged unless the trial court finds that the probative value 
of such evidence is outweighed by the prejudicial effect.”39  While the 2000 
Statute did not change the “shall be admissible” language, it did subject pro-
pensity evidence in these cases to a test balancing the probative value of the 
evidence and the likeliness of causing unfair prejudice.40  
The Missouri Supreme Court again struck down the 2000 Statute in its 
2007 holding in State v. Ellison.41  In that case, a jury convicted defendant 
Ellison of raping a minor multiple times.42  At trial, the government presented 
evidence, pursuant to the 2000 Statute, of Ellison’s prior conviction for sexual 
abuse in the first-degree for inflicting sexual contact resulting in serious phys-
ical injury on a thirteen-year-old victim.43  Over Ellison’s objection, the trial 
court admitted this evidence, finding “the evidence of a prior conviction [was] 
more probative than prejudicial.”44  The jury was specifically instructed that it 
could use the evidence of Ellison’s prior convictions to consider his propensity 
to commit the crime charged.45 
On appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, Ellison challenged the validity 
of the 2000 Statute under the Missouri Constitution.46  The court again cited to 
Article I, Sections 17 and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution in its holding that 
the 2000 Statute was unconstitutional.47  The court reiterated the common law 
understanding that admission of character evidence to prove propensity of a 
criminal defendant to act in accordance with that character trait directly con-
tradicts the rights afforded to criminal defendants under the Missouri Consti-
tution.48  While the court acknowledged that evidence of prior acts may be ad-
missible on grounds other than propensity – proving motive, intent, absence of 
  
 38. State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 39. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.025 (2000), invalidated by State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 
603 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (emphasis added). 
 40. Id.  
 41. 239 S.W.3d at 607–08.  
 42. Id. at 604–05.  
 43. Id. at 605.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 606.  
 48. Id. (“Evidence of prior criminal acts is never admissible for the purpose of 
demonstrating the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime with which he is pres-
ently charged . . . There are no exceptions to this rule.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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mistake, lack of accident, or common scheme or plan – it held firm that char-
acter evidence can never be used to show the propensity of a criminal defendant 
to act in accordance with that character trait.49 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In the years after the Missouri Supreme Court decided Ellison, debate 
continued between those concerned with the constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants50 and prosecutors who found it nearly impossible to get convictions 
for child sex abuse.51  An anonymous Jefferson County mother got involved in 
this debate after discovering her six-year-old daughter’s father had been sex-
ually molesting the child.52  After investigations by Children’s Division, sher-
iff’s detectives, and child therapists confirmed the likelihood of the molestation 
and revealed that the father had been previously accused of molesting another 
child, the mother again received unfortunate news: the prosecutor would not 
file charges against the father because of the lack of eye-witnesses and the dis-
jointed nature of the child’s retelling of the molestation.53 
The mother petitioned local politicians and lawmakers, and her story in-
spired Missouri Representative John McCaherty of High Ridge to file legisla-
tion to change the Missouri Constitution in an effort to make cases like her 
daughter’s easier to prosecute.54  The proposed amendment would create a state 
constitutional exception to the bar on the admissibility of propensity evidence 
by allowing evidence of prior convictions and allegations of child sexual abuse 
by a criminal defendant.55  The proposed amendment effectively circumvented 
the Missouri Supreme Court’s numerous holdings that the admission of pro-
pensity evidence in child sex abuse prosecutions was unconstitutional.56  The 
amendment passed easily through the Missouri General Assembly in the spring 
of 2014 and was added to the general election ballot.57  The measure was pre-
sented to voters as a necessary step in prosecuting and convicting dangerous 
  
 49. Id. at 607.  
 50. See Eli Yokley, Amendment 2 Would Change Type of Evidence Allowed in 
Child Sex Crimes, JOPLIN GLOBE (Oct. 25, 2014) https://www.jop-
linglobe.com/news/amendment-would-change-type-of-evidence-allowed-in-child-
sex/article_ed4db77a-5cb9-11ef-b39d-fb415ff0c428.html [perma.cc/C5QC-E2XN]. 
 51. See Nancy Cambria, As Sex Abuse Case Goes Unprosecuted, Some Want Mis-




 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
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child sex offenders.58  On November 4, 2014, Missouri voters approved the 
amendment (“2014 Amendment”) and Article I, Section 18(c) was adopted into 
the Missouri Constitution.59  The 2014 Amendment states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 and 18(a) of this article 
to the contrary, in prosecutions for crimes of a sexual nature involving 
a victim under eighteen years of age, relevant evidence of prior criminal 
acts, whether charged or uncharged, is admissible for the purpose of 
corroborating the victim’s testimony or demonstrating the defendant’s 
propensity to commit the crime with which he or she is presently 
charged. The court may exclude relevant evidence of prior criminal acts 
if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.60 
In State v. Prince, one of the first cases heard by the Missouri Supreme 
Court after the 2014 Amendment passed, the court grappled with the balancing 
test set out in the amendment.61  In that case, a jury convicted defendant Jordan 
Prince of first-degree murder, felony abuse of a child, and forcible sodomy 
after Prince sexually abused and strangled his girlfriend’s infant daughter to 
death in 2012.62  At trial, the government presented evidence of Prince’s juve-
nile record, which included allegations of “lewd and lascivious conduct with a 
minor.”63   
Prince claimed that because his prior crime involved his six-year-old 
niece and the present crime involved an infant who was not biologically related 
to him, these crimes were too dissimilar for the prior crime to be logically rel-
evant to the current action.64  The court, noting the low standard for finding 
evidence logically relevant as opposed to legally relevant,65 dismissed this ar-
gument, finding that the sexual nature of the crimes involving victims with a 
  
 58. See Editorial, More Harmful Initiatives Than Good Ones on Missouri’s Nov. 
4 Ballot, K.C. STAR (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.kansascity.com/opinion/editorials/ar-
ticle2500526.html (“Constitutional Amendment 2 is a reasonable and necessary meas-
ure to help sexually abused children and put dangerous offenders behind bars”). 
 59. H. J. Res. 16, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013); MO. CONST. art. 
I, § 18(c). 
 60. MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c).  
 61. 534 S.W.3d 813, 819 (Mo. 2017) (en banc); see also, MO. CONST. art. 1, § 
18(c). 
 62. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 816–17. 
 63. Id. at 817.  
 64. Id. at 819.  
 65. Evidence must be both logically and legally relevant to be admissible.  To be 
logically relevant, evidence must “make the existence of a material fact more or less 
probable.” State v. Taylor, 466 S.W.3d 521, 528 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).  To be legally 
relevant, the “probative value” of the evidence must outweigh the risk of “unfair prej-
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“close family-like” relationship to Prince was enough to make the prior crime 
logically relevant.66  Prince finally argued that because he committed the prior 
crime when he was a juvenile, it did not fall within the definition of a “prior 
criminal act” because it was merely a “delinquent act.”67  The court rejected 
this argument as well, stating that to fall within the exception to the character 
evidence rule laid out in the 2014 Amendment, the court looks to “Prince’s 
actual conduct, rather than the classification of his conduct,” to determine ad-
missibility.68   
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
this evidence in simply because it was classified as a “delinquent act.”69  The 
language of the 2014 Amendment states that relevant prior criminal acts, 
“whether charged or uncharged” are admissible as propensity evidence.70  The 
mere fact that the evidence admitted resulted from a juvenile conviction did not 
change its admissibility under the 2014 Amendment, and consequently, the 
court found no error in the trial court admitting it.71 
Prince further challenged the admission of his juvenile record not on pro-
pensity grounds but rather by arguing the record was not “logically relevant to 
[the] case.”72  Specifically, Prince argued the prior conduct was “too remote in 
time, based on a dissimilar act, and technically not a crime” because the charges 
had been brought in juvenile court.73  The court rejected the argument that the 
juvenile record was too remote in time by explaining that this was an issue 
pertaining to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.74  Further, 
the court explained that the test for determining if the probative value of the 
evidence outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice was “relaxed/diminished” by 
the adoption of the 2014 Amendment because the Amendment stated that the 
court “may exclude” evidence in this case.75  The court also noted that the ar-
gument was not necessarily appropriate because this balancing test exists to 
determine the legal relevance of evidence, while Prince argued here that the 
evidence was not logically relevant.76 
In State v. Rucker, the Eastern District of Missouri also dealt with this 
balancing test.77  In that case, a jury convicted defendant Tajeaon Rucker of 
  
udice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cu-
mulativeness.” Id.; see also Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
 66. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 819.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. MO. CONST.  art. I, § 18(c).  
 71. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 819. 
 72. Id. at 818.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 819.  
 75. Id. (emphasis added).  
 76. Id.  
 77. State v. Rucker, 512 S.W.3d 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). 
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first-degree child molestation and third-degree assault for molesting a ten-year-
old victim.78  At trial, the prosecution admitted evidence that the defendant had, 
years before, allegedly molested the same victim.79  Additionally, the victim’s 
sister, who was an eyewitness to both instances of abuse, testified and corrob-
orated the victim’s story.80  On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eastern 
District of Missouri, defendant Rucker made three arguments as to why the 
court should not have admitted the prior instance of alleged abuse into evi-
dence: (1) the alleged abuse occurred before the enactment of the 2014 Amend-
ment, so it should not apply in this case; (2) at the time of the appeal, there 
were “no applicable case law exceptions to the prohibition of prior bad acts 
evidence,” and (3) the prejudicial effect of the evidence of the alleged prior 
abuse substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence.81 
The court rejected all three of Rucker’s arguments, first finding that Arti-
cle I, Section 18(c) applied in this case because of the recent rule announced 
by the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Tipler v. Gardner, which held 
that Article I, Section 18(c) applied to all trials “occurring on or after” the date 
the amendment was enacted, regardless of when the alleged abuse occurred.82  
The court further found that the trial court did not “plainly err” in admitting the 
evidence of the alleged prior abuse.83  Because the evidence was relevant in 
corroborating the victim’s testimony, the “considerable amount of probative 
value” it had was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.84  How-
ever, after looking to the language of the amendment, specifically that “the 
court may exclude relevant evidence of prior criminal acts if the probative 
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice,” the court determined that “the General Assembly’s use of the word 
‘may’ indicates that the court has the discretion to exclude such evidence in 
these circumstances, but it is not obligated to do so.”85  Because of this, the 
court determined that even if the probative value of the evidence of the prior 
abuse was “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” the 
  
 78. Id. at 69.  
 79. Id. at 65.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 67.  Because defendant Rucker’s counsel at trial failed to make a timely 
objection to the evidence of the alleged prior abuse, the issue was not preserved on 
appeal, so the standard of review was for plain error. Id. at 65–66.  The court used a 
two-prong test to determine if there was plain error: (1) whether the error was “evident, 
obvious, and clear,” and (2) whether the error “resulted in a manifest injustice or mis-
carriage of justice.” Id. at 66 (quoting State v. Ray, 407 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2013)). 
 82. Id. at 68 (citing State ex rel. Tipler v. Gardner, 506 S.W.3d 922, 924 (Mo. 
2017) (en banc)). 
 83. Id. at 70.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 69 (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c)).  
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trial court still had the discretion to admit the evidence.86  Accordingly, the 
court upheld defendant Rucker’s conviction.87 
A little over a year later, in State v. Williams,88 the Missouri Supreme 
Court abrogated the Eastern District’s decision in Rucker, holding that propen-
sity evidence must be excluded when its probative value outweighs the risk of 
unfair prejudice.89  In Williams, a jury convicted defendant Travis Williams of 
three counts of first-degree statutory sodomy for repeated sexual abuse com-
mitted against the daughter of Williams’ girlfriend over a period of about four 
years.90  At trial, the circuit court allowed the government to read a stipulation 
to the jury that Williams had pleaded guilty to a charge of first-degree statutory 
sodomy in 1996.91  Williams agreed to allow the stipulation to be read to the 
jury but preserved his objection for appeal.92  The jury convicted Williams and 
sentenced him to three life sentences without the possibility of parole.93 
On appeal, Williams argued that on its face, the 2014 Amendment vio-
lated his due process rights.94  Williams also challenged the circuit court’s de-
cision to admit the evidence of his prior conviction without first expressly sub-
jecting the evidence to a balancing test to determine if its probative value out-
weighed the risk of unfair prejudice, and further argued that the risk of unfair 
prejudice did, in fact, outweigh the probative value of the prior conviction.95 
Williams specifically claimed that the 2014 Amendment violated his due 
process rights by allowing propensity evidence in criminal prosecutions.96  The 
court noted that Williams faced a high burden in order to prevail on this claim; 
he would have had to show that the 2014 Amendment “offend[ed] some prin-
ciple of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”97  The court agreed that the prohibition on propensity 
evidence in criminal prosecutions was “rooted” in tradition, but it also 
acknowledged that the 2014 Amendment presented a narrow exception to this 
tradition.98  This type of exception to the propensity rule for admitting evidence 
of a defendant’s prior sexual misconduct had almost become a tradition itself 
because a majority of jurisdictions either have statutes or rules that allow ad-
mission of this kind of evidence.99  In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the 
  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 70.  
 88. 548 S.W.3d 275 (Mo. 2018) (en banc), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 606 (2018). 
 89. Id. at 285 n.11.  
 90. Id. at 279.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 279 n.4.  
 93. Id. at 279.  
 94. Id. at 280.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 280–81 (quoting Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996)). 
 98. Id. at 281.  
 99. Id. at 282–83.  
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court also laid out the history of challenges to FRE 414, after which the 2014 
Amendment was closely modeled, and a number of cases where no due process 
violations were found.100   
The court rejected Williams’ claims that the circuit court was required to 
make an express finding that the probative value of Williams’ prior conviction 
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice before admitting the evidence.101  
While the court agreed this balancing test was crucial when deciding whether 
to admit prior crimes, it held that the 2014 Amendment did not require an ex-
press finding by the court.102  Further, the court found support in the record that 
the circuit court did carefully analyze whether the probative value of the con-
viction was outweighed by its risk of unfair prejudice.103  However, the court 
rejected the holding in Rucker that the trial judge had the discretion to admit 
the evidence even if its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.104  Even though the 2014 Amendment states that a trial court “may” 
exclude evidence where its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice, the court here looked to the practice of federal courts under FRE 
403, which similarly states that a court “may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair preju-
dice.”105  Because federal courts have understood this rule to mean that evi-
dence “must pass the legal relevance test” to be admitted, the Missouri Su-
preme Court adopted this rule as well.  Specifically, if a trial court finds that 
the probative value of the propensity evidence – admissible under the 2014 
Amendment – is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, the 
court is required to exclude this evidence.106 
The court then rejected Williams’ claim that the probative value of the 
evidence of his prior conviction was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, 
finding that the state had an “appreciable need” to admit the evidence.107  The 
only eye witness in Williams’ case was the victim, a nine-year-old child, and 
because of the difficulty that naturally arises with child witnesses – especially 
those who have experienced trauma108 – the court found that the government 
  
 100. Id. at 284–85 (citing United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Schaffer, 851 F.3d 166, 180 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Mound, 
149 F.3d 799, 285 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
 101. Id. at 286.  
 102. Id. at 287.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 285 n.11.  
 105. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 403).  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 290.  
 108. Claudia L. Marchese, Note, Child Victims of Sexual Abuse: Balancing a 
Child’s Trauma Against the Defendant’s Confrontation Rights – Coy v. Iowa, 6 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 411, 411–12 (1990). 
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faced “unique evidentiary challenges.”109  Because of the lack of other eyewit-
nesses, the probative value of Williams’ prior conviction was very high.110  The 
court again clarified that the probative value still must not be substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to be admissible.111 
Accordingly, the court analyzed whether the evidence of Williams’ prior 
conviction presented a risk of unfair prejudice that outweighed its probative 
value.112  It laid out the typical reasons why propensity evidence is usually kept 
out, specifically fear that the jury will punish the defendant for the past crime 
instead of the one currently charged or that the jury will punish the defendant 
just for being a bad person.113  The court, however, found that the probative 
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice in Williams’ case for a number of reasons.114  First, the prosecution 
presented the evidence to the jury in the form of a “dispassionate” stipulation 
as opposed to allowing the previous victim to testify, which would have been 
much more “jarring” for the jury to hear.115  Second, the facts and evidence of 
the prior conviction were not nearly as disturbing as all the evidence the jury 
heard in Williams’ current case, so the risk of unfair prejudice was not very 
high.116  Finally, when compared to the time spent explaining the evidence for 
the current charge, the prosecution spent very little time discussing the prior 
conviction.117  For these reasons, the court held that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of Williams’ prior conviction.118 
In light of these judgments from the Missouri Supreme Court, appellate 
courts across the state have continued to hear challenges to Article I, Section 
18(c), and in virtually almost every case, appellate courts have upheld the use 
of propensity evidence.119 
  
 109. Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 290.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 292.  
 115. Id. at 291.  
 116. Id. at 290.  
 117. Id. at 291.  
 118. Id. at 292.   
 119. State v. Lutes, 557 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018); State v. Tucker, 564 
S.W.3d 376, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018); Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 275; State v. Peirano, 
540 S.W.3d 523, 527–28 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018); State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 815 
(Mo. 2017) (en banc); State v. Edwards, 537 S.W.3d 848, 855 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017); 
State v. Jones, 546 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017); State v. Matson, 526 S.W.3d 156, 
158 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017); State v. Hood, 521 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017); 
State v. Rucker, 512 S.W.3d 63, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017); but see State v. Salmon, 563 
S.W.3d 725, 733 n. 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (excluding evidence of prior child abuse 
because it was not sexual in nature, and therefore did not fall within Article I, Section 
18(c) of the Missouri Constitution); State v. McWilliams, 564 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2018) (prosecution consented to exclude prior evidence of child sexual abuse 
because the State failed to give proper notice to the defendant). 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
On the surface, the debate over propensity evidence in sex crime prose-
cutions pits the interests of victims and criminal defendants against each other, 
and today’s debate echoes the discussion surrounding the introduction of FRE 
413, 414, and 415 in the 1990s.  This distinction is not so much a dichotomy – 
since it is entirely possible to advocate for victims and support criminal de-
fendants’ rights – but both sides of these trials face massive hurdles depending 
on the admission or exclusion of this evidence. 
This Part will first discuss the unique difficulties of prosecuting sex 
crimes against children and the use of “me too” evidence as a remedy. This 
Part then analyzes defendant’s rights and disagreement about whether there is 
value to propensity evidence. Finally, this Part suggests that Missouri courts 
should use a stronger balancing test when dealing with these difficult cases.  
A.  He Said, She Said: The Challenges of Prosecuting Sex Crimes 
Rape and sexual assault are some of the hardest crimes to prosecute, not 
only because victims are hesitant to come forward, but, when they do, because 
of the problems that arise at trial: the intimate settings in which these crimes 
typically occur leave no eyewitnesses, lack of physical evidence causes “he 
said, she said” testimony, and a deeply rooted culture of victim-blaming man-
ifests in juror bias against victims.120  While the general public tends to view 
child sexual abuse as one of the most heinous crimes, child sex offenders are 
especially difficult to prosecute because of the complexities that arise when a 
traumatized child is the only witness to the abuse other than the perpetrator.121  
Because of this, proponents of propensity evidence argue that rules like FRE 
413, 414, 415, and Article I, Section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution are 
necessary to bring repeat sex offenders to justice.  These rules essentially allow 
“me too” evidence, which can significantly bolster a victim’s claims and alle-




 120. Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in 
Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 672–73 (1998); Alletta Brenner, Resisting Simple 
Dichotomies: Critiquing Narratives of Victims, Perpetrators, and Harm in Feminist 
Theories of Rape, 36 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 503, 508 (2013). 
 121. See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense 
Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 15, 20 (1994). 
 122. Yixuan Zhang, Using the Power of “Me Too” Evidence in Criminal Sexual 
Assault Trials, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 31, 34 (2019). 
 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss4/11
2019] PROPENSITY EVIDENCE 1149 
1.  Difficulty with Child Witnesses and “Me Too” Evidence as a  
Remedy 
 
While “me too” evidence got its name long before the #MeToo movement 
began in 2017, the basic concept is the same.123  “Me too” evidence is testi-
mony or other evidence that a particular defendant has committed a similar 
wrong or crime against another person, even though that victim is not a party 
to the case.124  Plaintiffs use this as circumstantial evidence to bolster their 
claims that the alleged wrong or crime at issue was committed by the defend-
ant.125  “Me too” evidence is invoked today mostly in the context of employ-
ment discrimination claims,126 and the usefulness of “me too” evidence has 
been cited in support of allowing propensity evidence of sex abusers to be ad-
missible in criminal prosecutions.127 
Since the 1980s, courtrooms have adjusted traditional rules of criminal 
proceedings to create better accommodations to support child witnesses.128  
These changes were made in response to studies that showed the psychological 
consequences of child abuse as well as the added stress for children being pre-
sent in court and facing their abusers.129  If a child is too frightened to testify 
accurately or even at all – which correlates both with the age of the child and 
the severity of the abuse experienced – it may mean that a sex abuser could 
walk free.130  One way courts have tried to mitigate this stress on children is to 
allow the child to testify in another room, away from the defendant, or to pro-
vide a screen so that the child cannot see the defendant while testifying.131  
These types of accommodations have been challenged as Confrontation Clause 
violations, but the United States Supreme Court has permitted these accommo-
dations when judges find appropriate facts justifying their use.132   
Congress has passed legislation allowing live testimony by children via 
television in proceedings involving allegations of child abuse, depending on 
  
 123. Id. at 31; see also Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1286 (11th 
Cir. 2008). 
 124. See Cox v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 107, 118 (Mo. 
2015) (en banc). 
 125. Id.  
 126. See, e.g., id.; Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520, 529 (7th Cir. 
2008), as corrected (Jan. 21, 2009); Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1286. 
 127. Zhang, supra note 122, at 34.  
 128. Robert H. Pantell, The Child Witness in the Courtroom, 139 AM. ACAD. OF 
PEDIATRICS 3 (2017), https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/139/3/e20164008 
[perma.cc/U7eJ-HZ5J]. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 4.  
 131. Id. at 2.  
 132. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990) (holding that allowing a child 
witness to testify via closed circuit television to allow the child to be in a separate room 
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why the child is unable to testify.133  While this legislation signified a big step 
in the right direction for mitigating child witnesses’ stress and trauma, most 
child abuse cases are heard in state courts, which are inconsistent in the accom-
modations they are willing to provide to child victim witnesses.134 
In light of these difficulties, “me too” evidence could be particularly use-
ful in prosecutions of child abuse.  For this reason, adoption of rules like Article 
I, Section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution are beneficial for victims and 
prosecutors because they help supplement or bolster the testimony of victims.  
Nonetheless, rules like these continue to face scrutiny for violating long-stand-
ing rules against propensity evidence and the constitutional right of defendants 
to be tried only for the charged crimes.  
B.  The (Un)Reliability of Propensity Evidence and Unfair Prejudice 
The long-standing rules against propensity evidence have a lengthy his-
tory in our criminal law jurisprudence.135  For this reason, rules allowing pro-
pensity evidence of child sex offenders face sharp criticism.  Debate over this 
issue evokes another question: is sex abuse – or specifically, child sex abuse – 
a different kind of crime such that propensity evidence is actually reliable?  
General lay opinion might tend to answer this in the affirmative, and this could 
explain why Missouri voters enacted Article I, Section 18(c) in 2014.136  How-
ever, this consensus is not as pronounced in the legal and medical communi-
ties.137  As the understanding and study of pedophilia has developed over time, 
while a majority still consider it a disorder, a small minority of mental health 
professionals have gone as far as to categorize pedophilia as a sexual orienta-
tion.138  However, this remains a point of strong contention among physicians. 
  
 133. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(1) (2018). 
 134. Joëlle Anne Moreno, Einstein on the Bench?: Exposing What Judges Do Not 
Know About Science and Using Child Abuse Cases to Improve How Courts Evaluate 
Scientific Evidence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 531, 537 (2003). 
 135. See supra Part II.  
 136. See Hal Arkowitz & Scott O. Lilienfeld, Once A Sex Offender, Always A Sex 
Offender? Maybe Not, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (April 1, 2008) https://www.scientifi-
camerican.com/article/misunderstood-crimes/ [perma.cc/F8RF-Y4TW]. 
 137. Id.  
 138. A 2018 TEDx talk in which a German medical student asserted that pedophilia 
was a sexual orientation no different from heterosexuality received major backlash and 
was removed from the TEDx YouTube channel. TEDx Talk Under Review, TEDBLOG 
(June 19, 2018, 6:19 PM), https://blog.ted.com/tedx-talk-under-review/ 
[perma.cc/Y2MG-RQBS]; see also Margo Kaplan, Pedophilia: A Disorder, Not a 
Crime, N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/opinion/pedo-
philia-a-disorder-not-a-crime.html [perma.cc/GW4P-2ZFY]; Pessimism About Pedo-
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1.  The Propensity of Sex Offenders to be Repeat Offenders 
David Karp, one of the main proponents of FRE 413, 414, and 415, raised 
these issues as arguments in favor of adopting the rules at the time Congress 
enacted them.139  Specifically for prosecutions of child sex abuse, Karp ex-
plained that for a defendant with a history of child sex abuse, this history is 
evidence of that defendant’s “combination of aggressive and sexual impulses 
that motivates the commission of such crimes.”140  Karp further argued that 
defendants with these histories likely “lack[] the effective inhibitions against 
acting on these impulses, and that the risks involved do not deter [them].”141  
Karp essentially argued that evidence of a defendant’s propensity to commit 
sex crimes against children is much different than evidence of a defendant’s 
prior arrest record for unrelated offenses.142 
Others counter these arguments by positing that sex offenders actually 
have lower rates of recidivism than persons who commit other crimes.143  In a 
study conducted by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) of prisoners released in 
1994,144 sex offenders not only had lower recidivism rates for committing new 
sex offenses but also lower recidivism rates for committing other crimes as 
compared to other offenders.145  In that report, DOJ tracked prisoners in fifteen 
different states for three years and differentiated between offenders categorized 
as rapists, sexual assaulters, child molesters, and statutory rapists.146   
However, drawing firm conclusions from these types of studies is risky 
because these studies typically fail to consider how many sex crimes go unre-
ported.147  Victims – especially child victims – have a very difficult time re-
porting abuse for various reasons.148  Most victims are abused by someone 
  
 139. Karp, supra note 121, at 20.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. (“A person with a history of rape or child molestation stands on a different 
footing.”). 
 143. See Lave & Orenstein, supra note 17, at 817. 
 144. This is the most recent version of this kind of study conducted by the DOJ.  
More recent recidivism studies do not differentiate among violent offenders. 
 145. Lave & Orenstein, supra note 17, at 818.  
 146. Patrick A. Langan et al., Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 
1994, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (2003) https://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf [perma.cc/KZ7P-43YH]. 
 147. 73% of child victims do not report abuse for at least a year; 45% do not report 
for at least 5 years. Jayneen Sanders, 12 Confronting Child Sexual Abuse Statistics All 
Parents Need to Know, HUFFPOST (Jan. 25, 2017 8:29 PM) https://www.huff-
post.com/entry/12-confronting-statistics-on-child-sexual-
abuse_n_587dab01e4b0740488c3de49 [perma.cc/Z995-G5QW]. 
 148. Why Don’t They Tell? Teens & Sexual Assault Disclosure, NAT’L CHILD 





Holtzman: Balancing Act: Admissibility of Propensity Evidence Under Article
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
1152 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  84 
close to them,149  and the manipulative tactics of abusers, especially those who 
abuse children, make it very difficult for victims to come forward and be be-
lieved.  While the recidivism statistics seem to suggest that sex offenders are 
not repeat offenders, they fail to consider the amount of sex abuse that goes 
unreported and unpunished.  On the other hand, crimes that do have very high 
recidivism rates, like drug possession and sale, do not have comparable rules 
which would allow propensity evidence.150   
Critics of these rules have argued that they make incorrect assumptions 
about the psychology of sex offenders and its relation to propensity.151  In their 
article, “Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A Critical Look at the Admis-
sion of Prior Sex Crimes,” Professors Tamara Rice and Aviva Orenstein were 
particularly critical of common cultural myths about sexual predators, which 
they argued were the motivating factors in Congress’ decision to pass FRE 413, 
414, and 415.152  They explained that the “central assumption about perpetra-
tors of sex crimes – that they are a deviant discrete group of outsiders and psy-
chopaths – justifies the sex propensity rules and encapsulates their faulty psy-
chological, statistical, and sociological presumptions.”153  Professors Rice and 
Orenstein argued that this “faulty” understanding of sex offenders contributes 
to incorrect assumptions about their likelihood of recidivism.154  Proponents of 
the rule, they contended, incorrectly assume that sex offenders are more likely 
to commit future sex offenses than other types of criminals because of the de-
viant nature of their crimes, which is not based upon any real statistics or stud-
ies.155 
2.  Unfair Prejudice Where Prejudice is Already High 
When FRE 413, 414, and 415 were proposed, they faced harsh scrutiny 
from attorneys and policymakers across the country.  In fact, the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) wrote a report to the House of Delegates stating its dis-
approval of the rules after President Clinton signed them into law in 1994.156  
In this report, the ABA explained its fear that these rules would allow evidence 
that substantially prejudices jurors against certain defendants to the point that 
jurors would “not care if sufficient evidence of guilt exists” in convicting a 
criminal defendant.157  The report also cited the unreliability of propensity ev-
idence in general, and the ABA explained its concern that because recidivism 
  
 149. Sanders, supra note 147. 
 150. Lave & Orenstein, supra note 17, at 817. 
 151. Id. at 796. 
 152. Id. at 807–08. 
 153. Id. at 808. 
 154. Id. at 816. 
 155. Id. at 811.  
 156. ABA Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates, 22 FORDHAM 
URB. L. J. 343, 344 (1995). 
 157. Id. at 349.  
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rates for all crimes are high, the same justifications could soon create similar 
rules for all offenses.158  
The prejudice created by admitting evidence of prior abuse is also coupled 
with other prejudice that a criminal defendant faces, and this is especially true 
for black male defendants.159  The increasingly high arrest and incarceration 
rates of black men suggest disparate treatment and biases.160  Recent psycho-
logical studies have shown that participants were more likely to associate black 
defendants with “guilt” than with white defendants.161  When coupled with ra-
cial bias, it is difficult to envision a scenario in which the bias that results from 
admission of evidence of prior sex crimes – charged or uncharged – does not 
create a risk of unfair prejudice. 
While most sex crimes perpetrators are close to their victims, especially 
in cases of child abuse, allowing propensity evidence could worsen the racial 
bias problems inherent in our criminal justice system.  Considering these prob-
lems, as well as the fact that charges of child abuse alone are highly prejudicial, 
it is difficult to see where this type of propensity evidence would ever not be 
unfairly prejudicial against a defendant. 
Another concern with these rules is the “usual suspects” problem, which 
is often cited as an issue with utilizing DNA testing to identify perpetrators of 
crimes.162  This problem reflects the fear that law enforcement tends to only 
“round up the usual suspects” – people who have been arrested or previously 
charged with crimes in the past – to pin unsolved crimes on them.163  This 
problem could arise for sex crimes with unknown perpetrators if law enforce-
ment is more likely to “round up” those with prior records of sex offenses who 
will then be faced with the likely admission of those very records.   
The arguments both for and against propensity rules like Article I, Section 
18(c) raise valid claims and pit very closely held rights and values against one 
another.  This debate is so difficult because it seeks to answer impossible ques-
tions: whether propensity can ever be reliable in predicting behavior or if our 
criminal system, as it stands with total bars on propensity evidence, will ever 
be truly effective at prosecuting sex crimes. 
  
 158. Id. at 350.  
 159. Demetria Frank, The Proof is in The Prejudice: Implicit Racial Bias, Un-
charged Act Evidence & The Colorblind Courtroom, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC 
JUST. 1, 2–3 (2016). 
 160. Id. at 1–3.  
 161. Id. at 20.  
 162. See David H. Kaye, Rounding up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical 
Analysis of DNA Trawling Cases, 87 N.C. L. REV. 425 (2009).   
 163. Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1272 (2001).  
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C.  In Missouri: Balancing Test as a Check for Admissibility of Prior 
Sex Crimes 
Regardless of whether the proponents or critics of these rules have the 
stronger argument, these rules are the law in many states and in federal courts.  
In Missouri, it is even codified in the state constitution.164  One way Missouri 
courts can balance the interests of bolstering child victim testimony while en-
suring the constitutional rights of criminal defendants is to more strictly enforce 
the balancing test set out in Article I, Section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitu-
tion.  That is, “The court may exclude relevant evidence of prior criminal acts 
if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice.”165 
In State v. Williams, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that trial courts 
are not required to make an “express finding” that the probative value of the 
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice it 
presents before allowing the admission of evidence of prior sex crimes.166  This 
seems problematic.  The only safeguard afforded to criminal defendants in 
child sex crime prosecutions under the 2014 Amendment is this balancing test.  
Without requiring some kind of finding by trial courts that the danger of unfair 
prejudice does not outweigh the probative value of the prior crime, trial judges 
are afforded a great amount of discretion in their determinations of whether to 
allow this evidence.  One way for Missouri courts to protect the rights of crim-
inal defendants is to require trial judges to be more transparent in their deci-
sions to admit this evidence and create a list of factors that assist judges in 
determining what might constitute unfair prejudice in these prosecutions.  Pro-
fessors Lave and Orenstein laid out such factors as length of time since the 
prior crime, type of the prior crime, similarity of the prior crime to present 
crime, and age and gender of the offender.167 
The way Arizona has dealt with this issue provides a good example Mis-
souri could follow.  Rule 404(c) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence creates an 
exception to the bar on propensity evidence for criminal and civil cases involv-
ing sexual offenses.168  This rule sets out that the court may admit evidence of 
“other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . if relevant to show that the defendant had a 
character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the of-
fense charged.”169  In order to admit this evidence, the court must make specific 
findings that (1) the “evidence is sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that 
the defendant committed the other act”; (2) the trier of fact has a “reasonable 
basis to infer that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant 
  
 164. MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c).  
 165. Id.  
 166. State v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 275, 286 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 167. Lave & Orenstein, supra note 17, at 833–35.  
 168. ARIZ. R. EVID. 404(c). 
 169. Id. 
 
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss4/11
2019] PROPENSITY EVIDENCE 1155 
sexual propensity”; and (3) the “evidentiary value of proof” of the evidence is 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.170  Under the 
third prong, the court may look to multiple factors: the “remoteness of the other 
act”; the “similarity or dissimilarity of the other act”; “the strength of the evi-
dence that defendant committed the other act”; “frequency of the other acts”; 
and any other surrounding circumstances or relevant factors.171  
The specificity of the Arizona evidence rule helps find a middle ground 
between providing an avenue to bolster victim testimony while safeguarding 
the rights of criminal defendants.  Because trial courts must make specific find-
ings as to why the evidence is allowed, trial judges have less discretion in mak-
ing these decisions – or at least the decision making is more transparent.  Mis-
souri would benefit from a similarly specific balancing test in determining 
whether to admit propensity evidence.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Missouri voters have spoken on the issue: they believe propensity evi-
dence can and should be used against perpetrators of sexual crimes against 
children. While this rule stands in stark opposition to traditional rules of char-
acter evidence, it may still prove beneficial for victims of sex crimes.  Sex of-
fenses are some of the most underreported crimes and among the most difficult 
crimes to prosecute.  This stems from various factors such as a general culture 
of victim-blaming, manipulative abusers, and the lack of resources available to 
prove guilt in these cases.  Evidence rules allowing propensity evidence could 
be beneficial in encouraging more victims to come forward but may come at a 
cost of denying one of the most basic constitutional rights afforded to all crim-
inal defendants – to be tried only for the crime charged.  As Missouri attempts 
to manage these competing yet very significant interests, state courts should 




 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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